



Melissa Inzerillo

Sixteenth Judicial Circuit, Seat 2

AMENDMENT TO: Personal Data Questionnaire

November 17, 2024

Question 47 of the PDQ: Have you ever been sued by a client? Have you ever been a named party (personally or professionally) in or had a pecuniary interest in any civil or criminal proceedings? If so, give details, including, but not limited to, dates, and resolutions.

Original Answer: I have been named in Post Conviction Relief actions but as far as I'm aware none have been granted.

Amended answer: I would like to expand my previous answer to reflect the following:

A SLED check revealed that there were two federal complaints where I was named as a party. I was never served with these complaints, but I wanted to update my answer to reflect them.

Gilmore v. Inzerillo, 2:05-CV-1106-DCN (April 2005): It appears Mr. Gilmore filed a complaint alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The complaint was summarily dismissed for failure to state a cognizable claim under §1983. Mr. Gilmore's subsequent appeal of this order was also dismissed. I have attached a copy of the order dismissing the claim.

Coleman v. Sixteenth Circuit Court et al, 0:12-1927-JFA-SVH (October 2012): It appears Mr. Coleman filed a complaint against several parties, including me, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The complaint was summarily dismissed. I have attached a copy of the order dismissing the claim.

Question 36 of the PDQ: Itemize (by amount, type, and date) all expenditures, other than those for travel and room and board, made by you, or on your behalf in furtherance of your candidacy for the position you seek. If you have spent over \$100, have you reported your expenditures to the House and Senate Ethics Committees?

Amended answer: I spent \$56.69 on 9/17/24 on postcards for my candidacy.

Signed:

Date:

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

RECEIVED  
CLERK OF COURT

2005 APR 26 P 2:21

US DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA  
CHARLESTON

Tim H. Gilmore (aka Henry Tim Gilmore, Tim Henry  
Gilmore), #1210606,

Plaintiff,

vs.

Melissa A. Inzerillo,

Defendant(s).

) C/A No. 2:05-1106-DCN-RSC

) Report and Recommendation

Plaintiff has filed this matter pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Melissa A. Inzerillo. The complaint does not provide much information to the court, stating simply that the "said defendant did deprive due process and cruel and unusual punishment". In Section V of the complaint the plaintiff states in his prayer for relief that he seeks five (5) million dollars for pain and suffering. He asks that he be appointed counsel because he cannot read or write. He also asks that the Court disbar the defendant "for taking advantage of" him. See Complaint @ 5. A review of the 2004-2005 *Lawyer's Desk Book* reveals that the defendant, Melissa A. Inzerillo, is a Charleston County Public Defender.

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 118 L.Ed.2d 340, 60 U.S.L.W. 4346 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-325, (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 64 F.3d 951, (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1995)(*en banc*), *cert. denied*, Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction, 516 U.S. 1177 (1996); Todd v. Baskerville, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); and Boyce v. Alizaduh, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979). *Pro se* complaints

are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Leeke v. Gordon, 439 U.S. 970 (1978), and a federal district court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a *pro se* litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); and Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of New York, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). However, even under this less stringent standard, the complaint submitted in the above-captioned case is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Department of Social Services, 901 F.2d 387, (4th Cir. 1990).

The defendant is entitled to summary dismissal because she has not acted under color of state law. In order to state a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) the defendant(s) deprived him or her of a federal right, and (2) did so under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). An attorney, whether retained, court-appointed, or a public defender, does not act under color of state law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976)(private attorney); Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d 1154, 1155-1156 & nn. 2-3 (4th Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982)(court-appointed attorney); and Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-324 & nn. 8-16 (1981)(public defender).

The district court in Hall v. Quillen, *supra*, had disposed of the case against a physician and a court-appointed attorney on grounds of immunity. In affirming the district court's order, the Court of Appeals, however, indicated that lower courts should first determine whether state action occurred:

\* \* \* But immunity as a defense only becomes a relevant issue in a case such as this

if the court has already determined affirmatively that the action of the defendant represented state action. This is so because state action is an essential preliminary condition to § 1983 jurisdiction, and a failure to find state action disposes of such an action adversely to the plaintiff. \* \* \*

Hall v. Quillen, 631 F.2d at 1155 (citations omitted). See also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement . . . also avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.").

Since the plaintiff has named a defendant who must be summarily dismissed it is unnecessary to address the remaining issues.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. See Denton v. Hernandez, *supra*; Neitzke v. Williams, *supra*; Haines v. Kerner, *supra*; Brown v. Briscoe, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 & n. \* (4th Cir. 1993), *replacing* unpublished opinion originally tabled at 993 F.2d 1535 (4th Cir. 1993); Boyce v. Alizaduh, *supra*; Todd v. Baskerville, *supra*, 712 F.2d at 74; 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); and "new" 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [the court shall review, as soon as practicable after docketing, prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to any grounds for dismissal]. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.

Respectfully Submitted,



S/Robert S. Carr  
United States Magistrate Judge

April 26, 2005  
Charleston, South Carolina

Notice of Right to File Objections to Magistrate Judge's "Report and Recommendation"  
&  
The Serious Consequences of a Failure to Do So

The parties are hereby notified that any objections to the attached Report and Recommendation (or Order and Recommendation) must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service. 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. A magistrate judge makes only a recommendation, and the authority to make a final determination in this case rests with the United States District Judge. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-271 (1976); and Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 3411 (D.S.C. 1993).

During the ten-day period for filing objections, but not thereafter, a party must file with the Clerk of Court specific, written objections to the Report and Recommendation, if he or she wishes the United States District Judge to consider any objections. Any written objections must *specifically identify* the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. See Keeler v. Pea, 782 F. Supp. 42, 43-44, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 8250 (D.S.C. 1992); and Oliverson v. West Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1467, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS® 776 (D.Utah 1995). Failure to file written objections shall constitute a waiver of a party's right to further judicial review, including appellate review, if the recommendation is accepted by the United States District Judge. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91, 94 & n. 4 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, Schronce v. United States, 467 U.S. 1208 (1984); and Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 845-847 & nn. 1-3 (4th Cir. 1985). Moreover, if a party files specific objections to a portion of a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, but does not file specific objections to other portions of the Report and Recommendation, that party waives appellate review of the portions of the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation to which he or she did not object. In other words, a party's failure to object to one issue in a magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation precludes that party from subsequently raising that issue on appeal, even if objections are filed on other issues. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505, 508-509, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS® 8487 (6th Cir. 1991). See also Praylow v. Martin, 761 F.2d 179, 180 n. 1 (4th Cir.) (party precluded from raising on appeal factual issue to which it did not object in the district court), *cert. denied*, 474 U.S. 1009 (1985). In Howard, *supra*, the Court stated that general, non-specific objections are *not* sufficient:

A general objection to the entirety of the [magistrate judge's] report has the same effects as would a failure to object. The district court's attention is not focused on any specific issues for review, thereby making the initial reference to the [magistrate judge] useless. \* \* \* This duplication of time and effort wastes judicial resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purposes of the Magistrates Act. \* \* \* We would hardly countenance an appellant's brief simply objecting to the district court's determination without explaining the source of the error.

Accord Lockert v. Faulkner, 843 F.2d 1015, 1017-1019 (7th Cir. 1988), where the Court held that the appellant, who proceeded *pro se* in the district court, was barred from raising issues on appeal that he did not specifically raise in his objections to the district court:

Just as a complaint stating only 'I complain' states no claim, an objection stating only 'I object' preserves no issue for review. \* \* \* A district judge should not have to guess what arguments an objecting party depends on when reviewing a [magistrate judge's] report.

See also Branch v. Martin, 886 F.2d 1043, 1046, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 15,084 (8th Cir. 1989) ("no de novo review if objections are untimely or general"), which involved a *pro se* litigant; and Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 7 n. 1 (3rd Cir. 1984) ("plaintiff's objections lacked the specificity to trigger *de novo* review"). This notice, hereby, apprises the plaintiff of the consequences of a failure to file specific, written objections. See Wright v. Collins, *supra*; and Small v. Secretary of HHS, 892 F.2d 15, 16, 1989 U.S. App. LEXIS® 19,302 (2nd Cir. 1989). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections addressed as follows:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
Post Office Box 835  
Charleston, South Carolina 29402

## Coleman v. 16th Circuit Court

Decided Oct 30, 2012

C/A No.: 0:12-1927-JFA-SVH

10-30-2012

William T. Coleman, # 287408, Plaintiff, v. 16th Circuit Court; York County Public Defenders Office; Melissa Inzerillo, Public Defender; 16th Circuit Solicitor's Office; Jessica Holland, Solicitor, and Circuit Court Judge Lee Alfred, Defendants.

Shiva V. Hodges

### ORDER

This is a civil action filed by a state prisoner. Therefore, in the event that a limitations issue arises, Plaintiff shall have the benefit of the holding in *Houston v. Lack*, 487 U.S. 266 (1988) (prisoner's pleading was filed at the moment of delivery to prison authorities for forwarding to District Court). Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B) (2) (D.S.C.), pretrial proceedings in this action have been referred to the assigned United States Magistrate Judge.

By order dated August 6, 2012, Plaintiff was given a specific time frame in which to bring this case into proper form. Plaintiff has complied with the court's order, and this case is now in proper form.

#### **PAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE:**

By filing this case, Plaintiff has incurred a debt to the United States of America in the amount of \$350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914. This debt is not dischargeable in the event Plaintiff seeks relief under the bankruptcy provisions of the United States Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(17). The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1996

permits a prisoner to file a civil action without prepayment of fees or security, but requires the prisoner "to pay the full amount of the filing fee" as funds are available. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (b). **The agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect payments from Plaintiff's prisoner trust account in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b) (1) and (2), until the full filing fee is paid.** See *Torres v. O'Quinn*, 612 F.3d 237, 252 (4th Cir. 2010) ("We hold that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) caps the amount of funds that may be withdrawn from an inmate's trust account at a maximum of twenty percent *regardless of the number of cases or appeals the inmate has filed.*") (emphasis in original).<sup>12</sup>

Plaintiff submitted an Application to Proceed Without Prepayment of Fees and Affidavit (Form AO 240) and a Financial Certificate, which are construed as a Motion for Leave to Proceed *in forma pauperis*. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (2). A review of the motion reveals that Plaintiff does not have the funds to pay the first installment of the filing fee. Therefore, the amount due from Plaintiff is currently \$350.

Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed *in forma pauperis* is **GRANTED. TO THE CLERK OF COURT:**

This case is subject to summary dismissal based on an initial screening conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915 and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Therefore, the Clerk of Court shall *not* issue any summonses nor shall the Clerk forward this matter to the United States Marshal for service of process at this time.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Shiva V. Hodges

United States Magistrate Judge

October 30, 2012

Columbia, South Carolina

**casetext**  
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